Huang and Liu (2001) argue that there are essentially two different uses of the bare reflexive: ziji as a syntactic anaphor subject to the Binding Condition A, and ziji as a pragmatic logophor. Drawing on Sells’(1987) notion of logophoricity, Huang and Liu further claim that the availability of the relevant de se scenario is necessary for the logophoric reading of ziji. I argue that Huang and Liu’s account of logophoric ziji is problematic. First, sentence-free ziji is not linked with the speaker by default; second, de se attitude cannot be the necessary condition of logphoric ziji; third, the analysis of the blocking effect and the person asymmetry as a result of a pragmatic perspectual strategy is inconclusive. Their argument of direct-discourse paraphrases changes the truth-condition of the original sentence, and when the sentence is properly rewritten, the analysis does not apply because there is no conflict of perspective.

1. Introduction

The Chinese reflexive pronoun ziji has long been an interest to linguists for the reason that being a reflexive, it is theoretically subject to Binding Condition A, but in reality it often is not. The fact that ziji can be long-distance bound, i.e. not bound in its local governing category(GC) poses a threat to the Binding Theory. To account for the behavior of ziji, it is often argued that the notion of a governing category must be expanded and/or a series of movements are involved in its apparent violation of Condition A. Recent studies, however, begin to argue for a dissimilation of ziji.

One such an account is Huang and Liu (2001). They argue that what licenses the long-distance binding is the logophoric use of ziji. There are essentially two different uses of the bare reflexive. ziji is in some contexts a syntactic anaphor subject to the Binding Condition A, but in some other contexts, ziji is a pragmatic logophor. Furthermore, Huang and Liu claim that the dividing line between the two uses can be drawn syntactically.

I argue that the evidence Huang and Liu provide for the logophoric ziji and the defining logophoric feature they assign to it can both be countered. Moreover, their analysis of the blocking effect and the person asymmetry fail as an satisfying answer.
2. Source, Self, Pivot and consciousness

The notion of logophor is first introduced in association with African languages that have a special type of pronouns—pronouns that in indirect discourse refers exclusively back to the agent ‘whose speech, thoughts, feeling, or general state of consciousness are reported’ (Clements (1975)) It has been argued that Icelandic sig and Japanese zibun are also instances of logophors.

Sells (1987) proposes that there is no unified account of logophoricity, rather the antecedent of a logophor is associated with three primitive roles—

(1) a. Source: the one who is the intentional agent of the communication.
   b. Self: the one whose mental state or attitude the proposition describes.
   c. Pivot: the one with respect to whose(temporal-spatial) location the content of the proposition is evaluated.

A logophoric pronoun is linked with some NP in virtue of the fact that the NP plays any of the above roles. That is, a logophor is bound by the person whose (a) speech or thought, (b) attitude or state of consciousness, and/or (c) point of view, or perspective, is being reported.1

Drawing on the three primitive notions that Sells point out, Huang and Liu hold that there are enough evidence of ziji being a logophor. Furthermore, they extend Sells’ idea and propose a hierarchy—‘these three labels express a progressive degree of liberation in the linguistic expression of logohoricity, Source being the ‘core’, Self being the ‘extended,’ and Pivot yet further extended uses.’2

When one identifies herself as the internal agent, it is not difficult to see that the mental state she is reporting is also internal. When the state of mind is internal, the perspective taken will in turn be internal. That is, an internal Source necessitates an internal Self, and an internal Self obligates an internal Pivot. Moreover, Huang and Liu claim that a distinct feature of logophoric ziji is its connection with de se interpretation. Consider the following scenarios.

(2) S1: Zhangsan sees a pickpocket running away with someone’s purse.
   Zhangsan does not know that the stolen purse belongs to himself.
   Zhangsan says, 'The thief stole that (guy’s) purse!'

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1 Not everyone agrees with Sells proposal though. For example, Reinhart and Reuland (1993) hold that ‘deictic center’ plays a crucial role in the interpretation of long distance bound reflexives; Kuno (1987) emphasizes the notion of empathy, which is similar to Pivot. Recently, Oshima (2007) argues that empathic binding and logophoric binding are closely related but should be distinguished. Moreover, Pan (2001) argues that the behavior of ziji is so different from any distinct property associated with logophoricity, therefore ziji cannot be a logophor.

S2: Zhangsan sees a pickpocket running away with someone’s purse; further, Zhangsan knows that it is his own purse that is stolen. Zhangsan says, ‘The thief stole my purse!’

Both scenarios validate the use of *ta* as anaphoric to Zhangsan in (3). The speaker (the external Source) is able to use ‘*ta* (he)’ as anaphoric to Zhangsan, so long as the purse in fact is Zhangsan’s, with or without Zhangsan’s awareness. By contrast, only S2 validates the use of *ziji* in (4). As (4) is a special case of (3), the *de se* scenario S2 is a special case of the *de re* scenario S1. Moreover, the use of the logophoric *ziji* obligates *de se* interpretation.

(3)  
Zhangsan shuo pashou tou-le ta-de/ j/k pibao.  
Zhangsan say pickpocket steal-Perf his purse.  
Zhangsan said that the pickpocket stole his/her/its purse.

(4)  
Zhangsan shuo pashou tou-le ziji-de/ j/*k pibao.  
Zhangsan say pickpocket steal-Perf self’s purse.  
Zhangsan said that the pickpocket stole his/her/its purse.

Huang and Liu further argue that without the consciousness effect, it is very hard to obtain a long-distance binding of *ziji* in the following examples.

(5)  
a. Zhangsan kuajian-le changchang piping ziji-de naxie ren/.  
Zhangsan praise-Perf often criticize self-DE those persons  
‘Zhangsan praised those people who criticized him a lot.’

b. ??Zhangsan kuajian-le houlai sha-si ziji-de naxie ren/.  
Zhangsan praise-Perf later kill self-DE those persons  
‘Zhangsan praised those people who later killed him.’  
(Huang and Liu (43))

While Zhangsan may be aware of people’s criticizing him in (5a), it is not very likely that in (5b) he can be conscious of the fact that he would be murdered later. Examples like (3), (4) and (5) lead Huang and Liu to conclude that the availability of a relevant *de se* interpretation is necessary for the logophoric *ziji*.

Besides the cases of long-distance *ziji*, sentence-free *ziji* also poses a problem for Binding condition A. When *ziji* occur in a sentence without any syntactic antecedent, it is hard to see how it can be an anaphor. On the logophoric account, nevertheless, such a the sentence can be seen as involving a logophoric *ziji* bound by the speaker (the external Source).
3. Blocking effect

3.1. Blocking effect and person asymmetry

Intertwining Sells’ primitive roles and the de se interpretation associated with ziji, Huang and Liu believe that the blocking effects—that the logophoric reading of ziji to its long-distance antecedent is sometimes blocked by other NP, can be explained. In addition, the intriguing person asymmetry of the blocking effect: a first/second-person pronoun may block a third-person long-distance antecedent, but not the other way round, can be accounted for.

*ziji* in (7) can be read as either bound by the long-distance antecedent Zhangsan or by the local antecedent Lisi. *ziji* can be interpreted either as a logophor or a locally bound anaphor. However, (8) has only one reading—‘Zhangsan thinks that I am criticizing myself.’ That is, *ziji* is only locally bound by the first-person pronoun ‘wo (I).’ Similarly, (9) means ‘Zhangsan thinks that you are criticizing yourself.’ In both sentences, the long-distance binding of *ziji* is impeded by the presence of first and second-person pronouns *wo* and *ni*.

(7)    Zhangsan\(\_\) juede Lisi\(\_\) zai piping ziji\(\_\)/j.
    ‘Zhangsan\(\_\) thinks that Lisi\(\_\) is criticizing self\(\_\)/j.’

(8)    Zhangsan\(\_\) juede wo\(\_\) zai piping ziji\(\_\)*\(\_\)/j.
    ‘Zhangsan\(\_\) thinks that I\(\_\) is criticizing self\(\_\)*\(\_\)/j.’

(9)    Zhangsan\(\_\) juede ni\(\_\) zai piping ziji\(\_\)*\(\_\)/j.
    ‘Zhangsan\(\_\) thinks that you\(\_\) is criticizing self\(\_\)*\(\_\)/j.’

By contrast, the blocking effects do not occur in (10) and (11). *ziji* can be either long-distance bound by the first/second person pronoun or locally bound by the third person antecedent.

(10)    wo\(\_\) juede Zhangsan\(\_\) zai piping ziji\(\_\)/j.
    ‘I\(\_\) think Zhangsan\(\_\) is criticizing me\(\_\)/himself\(\_\)/j.’
3.2. Conflicts in perspectives

How are we to understand the blocking effect? A good answer must deal with the person asymmetry and explain both the occurrence of the blocking effect and the non-occurrence of it.

According to Huang and Liu, the blocking effect and the person asymmetry are best explained in terms of a perspective strategy. They propose that sentences with logophoric ziji can be paraphrased along the line with Kuno’s direct discourse hypothesis. Thus, a logophoric ziji in the reported speech will turn into a first-person wo in the direct discourse as shown in (12).

(12) a. Zhangsan juede Lisi taoyan ziji.
   Zhangsan think Lisi dislike self
   ‘Zhangsan thinks that Lisi dislikes him.’

b. Zhangsan juede, ‘Lisi taoyan wo.’
   Zhangsan think Lisi dislike me
   ‘Zhangsan thinks, ‘Lisi dislikes me.’

As we learn from Sells, when ziji is used as a logophor, it is linked with the matrix subject whose thoughts are being reported. However, if ziji in (13) is a logophor bound by Zhangsan, the result is a chaotic perspective clash.

(13) a. Zhangsan juede wo tzai piping ziji.
   Zhangsan think I at criticize self
   ‘Zhangsan thinks that I am criticizing him.’

b. Zhangsan juede, ‘wo tzai piping ziji.’
   Zhangsan think I at criticize self
   ‘Zhangsan thinks that “I am criticizing him.”

There are two occurrences of wo in the paraphrased direct discourse complement. Under the intended logophoric reading, the first wo refers to the external speaker of the entire sentence, i.e. the person reporting Zhangsan’s thought, and the second wo refers to Zhangsan, the internal speaker of the direct discourse complement. Since the two occurrences of wo are anchored in different sources, such a reading is infelicitous. Note how the logic here goes indirectly: it is because of the perspective conflict it involves that (13) is unacceptable under the intended reading. Huang and Liu claim that this explains
why a logophoric reading of *ziji* is blocked.

A similar case involves the second-person pronoun *ni*. Again, in the intended logophoric reading, *ni* refers to the addressee with respect to the external speaker, while *wo* refers to Zhangsan, the internal speaker. The different sources linked with *wo* and *ni* in the direct discourse complement are confusing. It is reasonable to assume that our perspective strategy should rule out such perplexing confusion. The logophoric reading is hence blocked and *ziji* cannot refer to Zhangsan.3

To summarize, Huang and Liu argue that when *ziji* is used as a logophor, certain perspective strategy is at work to make sure that clashes of perspectives are avoided. The rationale of their explanation is that presumably indirect discourse with logophoric pronouns/reflexives can be rewritten into direct discourse with reference to the first person pronoun. Yet sometimes the paraphrases result in a confusing state, so the long-distance binding of these ‘logophors’ had better not be available. In other words, when some such rewrites produce undesirable conflicts in perspectives, it is only reasonable to conclude that these sentences should not be paraphrased in the first place, i.e. the pronouns/reflexives in the indirect discourses are not to be read logophoricaly.

4. Counter-argument I: sentence free *ziji*

Following Yu (1992)Yu (1996), Huang and Liu note that *ziji* can be completely unbound syntactically and in these cases must refer to the speaker. They hold that sentence free *ziji* should be interpreted logophorically and is, by default, long-distance bound by the speaker (the external Source) as shown in (6).4

But what does it mean that a logophoric *ziji* is bound ‘by default by the external Source’? Why is the external Source the default binder?

In (14), *ziji* is naturally read as referring to the addressee and/or the generic second person. An intuitive setting for this is when (14) is uttered by a teacher or parent. Similarly, *ziji* in (15) refers to the addressee and the addressee is asked (demanded) not to intervene. In (16) there are two occurrences of *ziji*, while the second *ziji* is anaphoric to the first one, it is not clear that the first occurrence of *ziji* is by any means associated with the external speaker ‘by default.’ It might be understood as speaking towards the

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3 Huang and Liu further explain that third person NP is not obligatorily anchored to the external speaker and is free to be anchored to the internal speaker, so the third person NPs do not induce blocking. This is the case even when the matrix subject (internal speaker) is the first or second person.

4 Of course, one may object that when there is no syntactic binder, the so-called binding is legitimate only in a very weak sense. Li (1991) thinks that sentence-free *ziji* is referential, and that is why it can be used alone. For the sake of Huang and Liu’s argument, here I assume that sentence-free *ziji* is ‘bound’ in the discourse when it is correlated with some salient person, and I use ‘bound by the speaker/addressee’ and ‘refer to the speaker/addressee’ interchangeably with respect to sentence-free *ziji*. I discuss the issue of sentence-free *ziji* as ‘bound’ in the last section.
addressed that ‘you should be responsible for the trouble you make,’ or simply a universal claim that ‘everyone should be responsible for the trouble they make.’

(14) zuo ziji-de gongke.
    do self-DE homework
    ‘Do your own homework.’

(15) guan hao ziji-de shi (jiu hao).
    Manage well self-DE matter (only good)
    ‘Mind your own business.’

(16) Ziji chuang-de huo ziji fuze.
    Self rush-DE trouble self responsible
    ‘Whoever causes the trouble should be responsible for it.’

Pan (2001) points out how a sentence-free ziji in questions is not necessarily bound by the external speaker.

(17) Ziji wei-she-me bu qu ne?
    self why no go Q
    ‘Why don’t self(you) go?’         (Pan (29))

Pan also notes that (17) can be used to talk about a third party salient in the discourse. However, I do not agree with his analysis that ziji refers to the addressee. Rather, I think ziji is ambiguous here; it might be referring to either the addressee or the speaker. In fact, there are two elements in (17) that complicate the interpretation of ziji—the first is that this sentence is in the form of a question; the second is the verb ‘qu(go).’ Consider the following scenarios.

(18) S1: The logic assignment is difficult. After days of struggle, I finally finished it the night before it is due. With a sigh of relief, I said, ‘I have finally finish my homework.’
    S2: My friend, Alex, had been postponing working on his logic homework until the very night before the assignment is due. After hours of struggle (he did not sleep for the whole night), he finally got it done the next morning. I said to him, ‘(You) have finally finish your homework.’

5 When (16) is read as a universal claim, it actually implies that ‘You should be responsible for the trouble you make’ as well as ‘I should be responsible for the trouble I make.’
(19) Zhongyu zuo wan ziji-de gongke le.
Finally do finish self-DE homework Perf
‘Self(I/you) have finally finished the homework.’

The declarative sentence (19) is acceptable when uttered in both S1 and S2 described in (18); ziji can be interpreted as referring to either the speaker or the addressee. Meanwhile, the intuition of reading (19) along the lines with something like S1 is stronger. Specifically if ziji is placed at the beginning of the sentence, it is all more likely that ziji refers to the speaker.

(20) S1’: The logic assignment is difficult. After days of struggle, I finally finished the logic homework the night before the assignment is due. With an awe of disbelief, I asked myself, ‘Have I finally finish my homework?’

S2’: My friend, Alex, had been postponing working on his logic homework until the very night before the assignment is due. He was working on it when I went to bed. Next morning I woke up and Alex did not seem to sleep for the whole night. I asked him, ‘Have you finally finish your homework?’

(21) Zhongyu zuo wan ziji-de gongke le ma?
Finally do finish self-DE homework Perf Q
‘Have self(I/you) finally finished the homework?’

Both scenarios depicted in (20) validate the utterance of (21), so again ziji can be bound by either the speaker or the addressee. However, without the relevant scenario such as S2’, it is more likely that ziji in (20) is understood as referring to the addressee, since it is most common that a teacher and/or parent asks the student/child if she has finished her homework.

Two points of interest to be noted. First, in (19) and (21), when ziji is interpreted as referring to the speaker, the speaker is just the addressee. The utterances of (19) and (21) are mental monologues where the speaker is talking and asking a question to herself. So it may be more coherent to say that the ‘default binder’ of sentence-free ziji is the addressee, and in the appropriate scenarios, the addressee and the speaker are one and the same. Second, the fact that ziji is more prominently interpreted as bound by the speaker in the declarative sentence (19) but more so as bound by the addressee in the question form (21) is suggestive; questions, it seems, can initiate a change of focus or a shift of context.6

6 McCready (2007) argues that questions is an environment where context shift takes place. The
Verbs *lai* and *qu* usually indicate movements in the space. *lai* is similar to English ‘come’ and suggests movements ‘from point B to point A’; *qu* is is comparable with ‘go’ and means that a person moves ‘from point A to point B.’ In both cases, point A is the current location of the speaker. Nevertheless, the behavior of *lai* and *qu* are not exactly parallel. With *qu*, the reference point A may not necessarily be the speaker’s current location; when the speaker uses a *qu* sentence as an imperative and demands her addressee to move to some place, the addressee’s current location is point A. With this difference in reference points in mind, it is quite obvious that the sentence-free *ziji* in (22a) and (22b) have divergent orientation. *ziji* in (22a) can refer either to the speaker or the addressee, but in (22b) it is more likely to pick out the addressee as the referent. Note, however, (22b) have two other idiomatic interpretations. First, it can mean ‘help yourself,’ in which case *ziji* refers to the addressee. Second, the speaker may use (22b) to express that she does not need others’ help, something like ‘I can handle it myself’ and *ziji* refers to the speaker.

(22) a. Ziji qu.
    self go
    ‘Self go.’

   b. Ziji lai.
    self come
    ‘Self come.’

All these interpretations survive in questions. For (23a), *ziji* may refer either to the speaker or the addressee, since *qu* may have a different reference point other than the speaker’s current location. For (23b), *ziji* refers to the addressee under the spatial movement interpretation, but under the relevant idiomatic interpretations as explained above, *ziji* may pick out either the addressee or the speaker.

(23) a. Keyi ziji qu ma?
    can self go Q
    ‘Can self go?’

   b. Keyi ziji lai ma?
    can self come Q

shit is analyzed in terms of monstrous operators.

7 *lai* and *qu* can be put in rationale construction. For example, ‘John na yizhi lai/qu da huiren. (John took a chair to hit the bad guy)’

8 In the following interpretation, I ignore the readings where *ziji* is bound by a salient third party in the discourse.
‘Can self come?’

What is shown from the above examples is that directionals *lai* and *qu* do have corresponding deictic centers and they help to make salience of an agent, but the problem is that this salience is very easily overwritten. Going back to Pan’s example (29), Pan disagree with Huang and Liu that sentence-free *ziji* is by default bound by the speaker and argues that in this case *ziji* is bound by the addressee or the salient third party in the discourse. But his interpretation does not fully match the array of *ziji* interacted with *lai* and *qu*.

On the other hand, Huang and Liu do not explain why the default binder is the external speaker, nor do they discuss what the default rule really is and what happens in the non-default cases. Moreover, given that Huang and Liu adopt the direct discourse hypothesis, how does the direct discourse rewrite mechanism work on sentence-free *ziji*? How would it help us to understand why *ziji* may sometimes refer to the speaker and sometimes the addressee? To sum up, treating sentence-free *ziji* as bound by the speaker by default is an over-simplification, and it does not seem to square with what Huang and Liu say about logophoric *ziji* in general.

5. Counter-argument II: source, self, consciousness and de se
5.1. Where the source is

Huang and Liu claim that there is a hierarchy among the three primitive notions associated with logophoricity: Source is the most fundamental, then Self, while Pivot is the least. In (24), when *ziji* is read logophorically, the long-distance antecedent Zhangsan is the internal Source of the reported speech. Further, by taking Kuno’s direct discourse hypothesis literally, (24) can be taken as Zhangsan saying, ‘Lisi said that that book hurt me!’

![Image](image-url)

By contrast, *ziji* is obligatory long-distance bound by Zhangsan in (25a), but Zhangsan is obviously not the internal Source in this case. Moreover, (25b), a rewrite of the indirect discourse into direct discourse with *ziji* turning into *wo* does not work. What

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9 Aside from the sentence-free *ziji*, Pan argues that *ziji* can be interpreted as either Zhangsan, Lisi, or even the speaker (external Source, indicated by index *k*) in the following sentence: ‘Zhangsan zhidao Lisi xihuan *ziji* ma? (Does Zhangsan know that Lisi like *self*?)’ Pan (2001) example (30). The interesting question here is how, when there are already two possible binders, the external Source can still be a binder of *ziji*. Is there a hierarchy of processing? What might be the default binder and why?
is infelicitous about (25b) is that the real internal Source is Lisi and Zhangsan is the ‘intermediate’ Source; it is not all clear who the speaker of the direct discourse element really is.

     ‘Zhangsan heard from Lisi that that book hurt himself/*j.’

     b. ?? Zhangsan 某从 Lisi 計那里 thingshuo, ‘naben shu hai-le wo/*j.’
     ‘Zhangsan heard from Lisi, “That book hurt me/*j.”’

5.2. De se attitude

Huang and Liu claim that for ziji to qualify as a logophor, its long-distance antecedent must be able to ascribe to herself a corresponding belief regarding the speech, thought or attitude reported. As shown in (3), (4) and (5), a relevant de se scenario is crucial.

Nevertheless, evidence presents itself against the idea that de se self-ascription is necessary for the long-distance binding of ziji. The verb mingbai (to know, to understand) is a presupposition trigger; like its English counterpart, mingbai is factive and what follows after it must be true for the sentence to be felicitous. So the scenario that validates (26) is one where Lisi is badmouthing Zhangsan and Zhangsan is fully aware of this criticism.

(26) Zhangsan 某 mingbai Lisi 計在 piping ziji/*j.
     ‘Zhangsan understands that Lisi is criticizing self/*j.’

While (26) itself seems unproblematic, its negations are worth investigation. When the negation takes the narrow scope, the result is (27), true when Zhangsan knows that he is not the target of Lisi’s verbal attack. The wide scope negation yields (28), true when Zhangsan is criticized by Lisi yet lacks the relevant understanding.

(27) Zhangsan 某 mingbai Lisi mei 某在 piping ziji.
     ‘Zhangsan understands that Lisi is not criticizing self/*j.’

10 Other such attitude verbs include ‘xiaode (to know, to be aware of )’ and ‘qingchu (to be clear about).’
(28) Zhangsan_ bu mingbai Lisi_ zai piping ziji_.  
Zhangsan not understand Lisi at criticize self  
‘Zhangsan_ does not understand that Lisi_ is criticizing self.’

There is no doubt that ziji is long-distance bound by Zhangsan in both (27) and (28), but a de se belief can be ascribed to Zhangsan in (27) only. The problem with (28) is that even though Zhangsan can play the roles of Source, Self and Pivot, there is no relevant de se belief that he has regarding whether Lisi is criticizing him.

What is shown from these examples is that the availability of a de se belief is not necessarily required for ziji to be long-distance bound. There is no de se belief, true or false, that can be ascribed to Zhangsan. The truth of (28) relies on the failed presupposition—that Zhangsan does not understand he is belittled. Besides, it is not even that an external speaker can make a false report regarding whether Zhangsan has such a belief.

Two more examples further the argument that de se attitude is not a necessity. In (29), the verb ‘wang-le (forget)’ indicates that Zhangsan does not possess the relevant belief at the time of speech; in (30), Zhangsan simply ‘huaiyi (suspect)’ that Lisi lied to him, but is not fully convinced so.

(29) Zhangsan_ wang-le Lisi_ pian-guo ziji_.  
Zhangsan forget-Perf Lisi lie-Perf self  
‘Zhangsan_ forgets that Lisi_ lied to self.’

(30) Zhangsan_ huaiyi Lisi_ pian-le ziji_.  
Zhangsan suspect Lisi lie-Perf self  
‘Zhangsan_ suspects that Lisi_ lied to self.’

6. Counter-argument III: from Zhangsan’s point of view

Suppose we grant the properties associated to logophoricity and set aside the problem regarding sentence-free ziji and the issue of whether the so-called logophoric ziji mandates de se interpretation. Let us further assume that when ziji is used logophorically, the indirect discourse complement can be rewritten into a direct discourse complement. Crucial to their analysis is the way Huang and Liu delineate the content of the direct discourse complement. To validate their explanation of the blocking effect as a result of perspective conflicts, we must take a closer look of how the internal speaker’s thought is/should be presented.

6.1. Direct discourse

Suppose Bill is the speaker and he reports, ‘John says that I am smart.’ The reported speech (or proposition) is ‘Bill is smart.’ How would John put it?

When John says it, he can simply utter, ‘Bill is smart,’ or ‘You are smart,’ when
Bill is the addressee. Or, perhaps what John actually says is, ‘He is smart,’ with a finger pointing to Bill. All of the above scenarios have the same truth conditions. (32) is the Chinese counterpart of (31).

(31) a. John says that I am smart.
    b. John says, ‘Bill is smart.’
    c. John says, ‘You(addresssee=Bill) are smart.’
    d. John says, ‘He(deictically referring to Bill) is smart.’

(32) a. John shuo wo he congming.
    John say I very smart
    ‘John says that I am smart.’

    b. John shuo, ‘Bill he congming.’
    John say Bill very smart
    ‘John says, “Bill is smart.”’

    c. John shuo, ‘ni he congming.’
    John say you very smart
    ‘John says, “You(addresssee=Bill) are smart.”’

    d. John shuo, ‘ta he congming.’
    John say he very smart
    ‘John says, “He(deictically referring to Bill) is smart.”’

By contrast, ziji in the reported speech will turn into ‘wo’ in the direct quotation as shown in (33), (34) an (35). This is so when there is no intervening NPs between ziji and its antecedent, regardless of the person feature of the antecedent.\(^{11}\) Note that in all these reconstructions from indirect discourse into direct discourse, the paraphrases preserve the truth conditions of the original sentences.\(^{12}\)

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\(^{11}\) I consider the reconstructions with pronouns only. Of course, with ‘John shuo ziji he congmin (John said he is smart)’, what John literally said can be ‘John is smart,’ or ‘Mary’s husband is smart’ (suppose John and Mary are married).

\(^{12}\) Since there is no intervening NPs, ziji in these sentences are locally bound. Notice that according to Huang and Liu, sentence-free ziji is logphoric, and long-distance bound ziji must be logphoric, the question now is whether locally bound ziji can be logphoric as well. If we can successfully reconstruct the indirect discourse into a corresponding de se direct discourse, may we also say that the locally bound ziji is a logophor?
(33) a. Wo shuo ziji he congming.
   I say self very smart
   ‘I say that I am smart.’

   b. Wo shuo, ‘wo he congming.’
   I say I very smart
   ‘I say, “I am smart.”’

(34) a. Ni shuo ziji he congming.
   you say self very smart
   ‘You say that you are smart.’

   b. Ni shuo, ‘wo he congming.’
   you say I very smart
   ‘You say, “I am smart.”’

(35) a. Ta shuo ziji he congming.
   he say self very smart
   ‘He says that he is smart.’

   b. He shuo, ‘wo he congming.’
   he say I very smart
   ‘He says, “I am smart.”’

6.2. Direct discourse and blocking

Back to sentences with ziji and intervening NPs. Suppose Lisi is the speaker
(external Source), in (36) it is Zhangsan’s thought that is being reported. (36b) is how
Huang and Liu paraphrase the indirect discourse complement to the direct discourse
complement. (36c) and (36d) are, however, what I argue the reconstructions ought to be.

(36) a. Zhangsan juede wo zai piping ziji.
   Zhangsan think I at criticize self
   ‘Zhangsan thinks that I am criticizing self.’

   b. ??Zhangsan juede, ‘wo/ zai piping wo.’
   Zhangsan think I at criticize I
   ‘Zhangsan thinks, “I am criticizing me.”’

   c. Zhangsan juede, ‘Lisi/ zai piping wo.’
   Zhangsan think Lisi at criticize I
   ‘Zhangsan thinks, “Lisi is criticizing me.”’
As shown in (33), (34) and (35), \textit{ziji} will be rewritten as \textit{wo} in the direct discourse paraphrases, because the perspective has been shifted from that of the external to the internal speaker.\footnote{In (33), the external speaker is also the internal speaker.} Likewise, \textit{ziji} in (36a) turns into \textit{wo} in the direct discourse. There are two occurrence of \textit{wo} in (36b); while the second one is a rewrite from \textit{ziji} and refers to Zhangsan, what the second \textit{wo} refers to is curious.

Presumably, it is the Lisi-refering \textit{wo} from (36a). Huang and Liu use (36b) to illustrate why blocking exists. It is because the first \textit{wo} is anchored to the external speaker but the second \textit{wo} to the internal speaker that the different sources make the sentence confusing, and our perspective strategy block such processing. In other words, \textit{ziji} in (36a) cannot be logophorically bound by Zhangsan.

I agree that it is disastrous if a sentence contains two (or more) occurrences of \textit{wo} anchored to divergent sources. I also agree that a rational perspective strategy would not be happy to see such a disaster. However, I have problem with how the indirect discourse is paraphrased; that is, I do not think the reconstruction of the direct discourse complement is properly done in Huang and Liu’s analysis.

To begin with, the content of the direct discourse is supposed to be from Zhangsan’s point of view. Second, in direct discourse, the first person \textit{wo} can only refer to the internal speaker. This is why in (31) and (32) there is no ‘I’ or \textit{wo} in the direct discourse paraphrases. Hence, there is no way Zhangsan can be think, ‘I (referring to the external speaker=Lisi) am criticizing me (referring to Zhangsan).’ Moreover, if in (36b) Zhangsan is thinking, ‘I (Zhangsan) am criticizing me (Zhangsan),’ its truth condition is very different from that of (36a).

The correct reconstruction of the direct discourse complement ought to be one in which \textit{ziji} in (36a) turns into \textit{wo} in the direct quote, and the original \textit{wo} is changed accordingly at the same time. From Zhangsan’s point of view, the external speaker is someone other than himself. (36c), (36d) and (36e) each show such a paraphrase.

In (36c), \textit{wo} is replaced with Lisi, so it is clear that Zhangsan thinks that Lisi is criticizing Zhangsan. In (36d), \textit{wo} turns into the second person \textit{ni} in the direct quote, as the ‘external speaker’ is the ‘internal addressee’ with respect to Zhangsan. The resulting
direct discourse complement is ‘You are criticizing me.’

The external speaker wo can also be the third person ta salient in Zhangsan’s mentalese. In this case, what Zhangsan thinks is, ‘He is criticizing me.’ In both (36d) and (36e), we can rewrite (36a) in such a way that ziji is interpreted as a logophor, and the references of the pronouns wo, ni and ta in the direct discourse complement are all relative to Zhangsan. Since they are all anchored to the internal Source, there will be no perspective conflicts.14

Contrary to what Huang and Liu argue, when Zhangsan’s thought is properly represented, the intended logophoric reading of ziji is available. With due attention paid to the direct discourse complement, we see no perspective conflicts.

What follows from Huang and Liu’s analysis is a dilemma. On the one hand, suppose the underlying strategy of their account is on the right track and the logophoric ziji can indeed be translated into sentences with direct discourse and reference to the first person, after a careful reexamination of the paraphrase mechanism, we see there is no blocking effect. That is, a long-distance bound ziji is still available even when the intervening NP is the first or second person. On the other hand, if we firmly believe that blocking does take place, then Huang and Liu’s answer is wrong. We have to figure out a different explanation of why there is blocking.15

The following summarizes the general dialectic.

i. We have a perspective strategy that aims to prevent confusion; if one reading of a sentence involves perspective conflicts, that reading is blocked.

ii. Some sentences with presumably logophoric ziji, when rewritten with direct quotation, invoke conflicting perspectives.

iii. Hence, a logophoric reading of ziji in such sentences are blocked.

iv. But the above-mentioned sentences can be paraphrased into sentences with direct quotation without invoking perspective conflicts.

Therefore either the logophoric reading of these sentences must be explained by factors other than the perspective strategy or there is no blocking of the logophoric reading of these sentences.

7. Conclusion

To conclude, the evidence is ample to counter Huang and Liu’s analysis of ziji.

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14 Similar cases can be made to the second-person intervening NP ni.

15 Anand (2006) argues that there are in fact two kinds of ziji— one of LOG-Mandarian and one of IND-Mandarian. Drawing on a systematic split of felicity judgments regarding ziji sentences, Anand argues that the two dialects of Mandarin with respect to ziji each has its own set of rules. Very roughly, in IND-Mandarian, a second-person intervener would not block a first-person long-distance antecedent, but it would in LOG-Mandarian.
First, they argue that the logophoric account is applicable to all non-Condition A-abiding cases, including both the long-distance bound \textit{ziji} and sentence-free \textit{ziji}. But sentence-free \textit{ziji} is never linked to the speaker by default and may well be associated with the addressee or receives a ‘whoever’ reading. Besides, if long-distance bound \textit{ziji} is logophoric, then \textit{de se} attitude is not a necessary condition of logophoricity; \textit{ziji} can be long-distance bound even when the binder lacks the relevant \textit{de se} belief. Third, the analysis of the blocking effect and the person asymmetry as a result of pragmatic perspectual strategy is inconclusive. Paraphrases that respect the original truth-condition shows no conflicts of perspectives.

In other words, if the defining characteristics and properties Huang and Liu lay out for the logophoric \textit{ziji} are meant to be the necessary conditions, their account is incorrect; if, on the other hand, they are meant to be simply the sufficient conditions, the theory is utterly inconclusive.

Lastly, there are a few interesting questions raised but not answered by Huang and Liu’s approach. To begin, in many of the sentences discussed in this paper, \textit{ziji} can either be locally bound or long-distance bound and of course it is ‘Condition A-violating’ long-distance cases that has been put into focus. The availability of both readings seem to indicate a duality of \textit{ziji}, but is one more primitive or prominent than the other? When a competent speaker processes a sentence involving \textit{ziji}, does she thinks of it first as an anaphor or a logophor? Second, while adopting Sells’ three primitive roles of Source, Self and Pivot, Huang and Liu maintain that there is a rank of importance among the three and the order being Source, Self and then Pivot. Whether this indeed is the case is not that clear. Perhaps different languages emphasize on a different order. Ironically, however, Kuno’s direct discourse hypothesis, which Huang and Liu readily accept and apply in their analysis of the blocking effects is based on the notion of empathy, or Pivot. Yet regarding the similarity and difference between logophoric and empathic binding, Oshima’s study of the Japanese data is certainly of interest; it will be worth exploring if related evidence can be found in Chinese and other languages.

REFERENCES


